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an ascendant position. In short, the Court has yet to offer a dependable guide in this critical area, but has perhaps further confused
the litter upon the commerce clause battleground. It is no doubt
true, as suggested by many writers in the tax field, 9 that problems
of this complexity are more amenable to legislative than to judicial
solution. Hopefully, the solution will not be long in coming; for
if one thing is certain in light of the ever-increasing economic needs
of the states, it is that some consistent guide must be formulated
for the convenience and protection of both states and taxpayers.
It is submitted that the most equitable approach will be found
within the philosophical framework of the "multiple burdens" doctrine in tandem with a realistic system of apportionment. As in
other areas of life in this fast-paced world, the efforts expanded
in seeking absolute resolutions of problems will produce a greater
net return if exerted instead in pursuit of equitable compromise.
HENRY STANCILL MANNING, JR.

Corporations-De Facto Corporations-EstoppelModel
Business Corporation Act
Although the submitted articles of incorporation were rejected, the defendant nevertheless began doing business as a corporation. Subsequently, defendant acquired plaintiff's business, giving
the purported corporation's note therefor. Shortly thereafter, articles of incorporation were issued; but within six months, the corporation failed and was left without assets. Plaintiff, suing on the
note given by the defendant on behalf of the purported corporation,
sought to hold defendant personally liable on the basis that no
corporation had existed at the time of the purchase. Defendant
resisted liability on the grounds that plaintiff had dealt with either
a de facto corporation or a corporation by estoppel. Defendant's
contentions were rejected in Robertson v. Levy,1 which construed
statutory provisions' equivalent to sections 50' and 139" of the
" See, e.g., Braden, Cutting the Gordian Knot of Interstate Taxation, 18
L.J. 57 (1957); Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 1324 (1959). For a view
from the other side of the bench, see the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
476-77 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
197 A.2d 443 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964).
'D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-921c, -950 (1961).
'Upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation, the corporate
existence shall begin, and such certificate of incorporation shall be
OHIO ST.
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Model Business Corporation Act "to eliminate the concepts of estoppel and de facto corporations .... -"
In situations where defective incorporation precludes de jure
existence of a corporation, courts have recognized de facto existence to bar personal liability where four requisites are met: (1) a
valid law under which the corporation could have been formed,

(2) a good faith attempt to comply with such law, (3) a "colorable" compliance with such law, and (4) actual user or exercise
of corporate powers. 7 The doctrine supposedly enables courts to
analyze the particular facts of each case and thus balance conflicting policy considerations: to discourage unauthorized assumptions
of corporateness, and to favor doing justice to the parties and to
uphold security of transactions with corporations."
Application of this elastic concept varies with courts9 and has
been sharply criticized.1 0 In fact, the framers of the Model Business Corporation Act intended that section 50, providing that corporate existence begins only upon the issuance of a certificate of
incorporation, abolish any significance of de facto corporateness.1
Robertson conforms with this intention. The result aids in ending
a confusing and unpredictable state of the law.
conclusive evidence that all conditions precedent required to be performed by the incorporators have been complied with and that the
corporation has been incorporated under this Act, except as against
this State in a proceeding to cancel or revoke the certificate of
incorporation or for involuntary dissolution of the corporation.
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT § 50 (1953).
' "All persons who assume to act as a corporation without authority so to
do shall be jointly and severally liable for all debts and liabilities incurred
or arising as a result thereof." ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. Cop. ACT § 139
(1953).
197 A.2d at 447.
0

ROBINSON, NORTH CAROLINA COPORATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 11

(1964). Under the de facto doctrine it was held that although the validity
of the corporate entity was subject to direct attack by the incorporating
state, it was not subject to collateral attack by outside parties. Ibid.
'See Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Shepherd, 185 U.S. 1 (1902); Midwest
Air Filters Pac., Inc. v. Finn, 201 Cal. 587, 258 Pac. 382 (1927); Mabel
First Lutheran Church v. Calwallader, 172 Minn. 471, 215 N.W. 845 (1927);
Pearson Drainage Dist. v. Erhardt, 239 Mo. App. 845, 201 S.W.2d 484
(1947) ; Hansen v. Village of Ralston, 147 Neb. 251, 22 N.W.2d 719 (1946);
Culkin v. Hillside Restaurant, Inc., 126 N.J. Eq. 97, 8 A.2d 173 (1939).
STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 27 (1949).
' See BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS § 30 (1946).
"E.g., id. § 20 ("the conglomeration of judicial decisions present a
discouraging and baffling maze") ; STEVENS, op. cit. supra note 8, § 26 ("inaccurate and confusing").
"IABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 50, 4 (1960).
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Robertson, however, not only denies the de facto doctrine, but
also rejects the concept of corporation by estoppel.' 2 Although some
early cases viewed de facto corporateness as a prerequisite to corporation by estoppel,"3 the majority now recognizes the two concepts as distinct and capable of independent application. 4 While
the de facto doctrine in many cases imparts to a defective corporation a general corporate status,' 5 the concept of corporation by
estoppel applies only to some particular transaction where there
have been dealings on a purportedly corporate basis."0 However,
the term "corporation by estoppel" is somewhat misleading in that
it implies the existence of a third type of corporation in addition
to corporations de jure and corporations de facto. The term does
not refer to an entity, but rather describes a result the courts reach
by applying the equitable doctrine of estoppel to the dealings between the parties.
Assuming the desirability of eliminating the conceptualistic de
facto doctrine, its benefits may yet be retained by using estoppel
concepts to do justice in individual cases and preserve security of
transactions.
Estoppel applies where there is a misrepresentation, reliance on
the misrepresentation by a third party, and a change of position by
the third party.' Thus, if an association deals with third parties
on a corporate basis despite its failure to file a certificate, it could
be estopped from denying its corporate existence where the third
party is suing it.' Similarly, a third party could be estopped from
"2Since N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8 (1960) is an enactment of section 50
of the Model Business Corporation Act, it seems likely that North Carolina

would rule that de facto corporateness was abolished by the enactment
of the statute. However, since North Carolina has not enacted section 139

of the Model Act, it seems very unlikely that it would go so far as to
hold that corporation by estoppel was also abolished.
"E.g., Bibb v. Hall, 101 Ala. 79, 14 So. 98 (1893); Midland Bank v.
Harris, 114 Ark. 344, 170 S.W. 67 (1914) ; Talbert v. Grist, 198 Mo. App.
492, 201 S.W. 906 (1918).
"See LATTiN, CORPORTIONS ch. 4, § 6 (1959); 14 CALIF. L. RiV. 486

(1926).

See LATTiN, op. cit. supra note 14, ch. 4, § 4.
14 CALn. L. REv. 486, 487 (1926).
Id. at 486.
" See, e.g., Ehrlich & Co. v. Slater Co., 183 Cal. 709, 192 Pac. 526
(1920); Russell Lumber & Supply Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 262 Ky. 388,
1

1

90 S.W.2d 372 (1936); Dobson v. Maytag Sales Corp., 292 Mich. 107, 290
N.W. 346 (1940); Empire Mfg. Co. v. Stuart, 46 Mich. 482, 9 N.W. 527

(1881); Perine v. Grand Lodge A.O.U.W., 48 Minn. 82, 50 N.W. 1022
(1892); Jewell v., Grand Lodge A.O.U.W., 41 Mich. 405, 43 N.W. 88
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denying the existence of the corporation where the corporation is
suing the third party.1" But since the third party has not represented
the association as a corporation, there is, strictly speaking, no estoppel.2 0 However, courts normally say that the third party is
"estopped" 2' since he admitted or acquiesced in the "corporation's"
pretension.22 The reasoning for such a holding is more persuasive
in the case of a counterclaim by the third party.'
Courts are split on the question of estoppel in situations where
(1889); Taylor v. Aldridge, 180 Miss. 635, 178 So. 331 (1938); Warren
v. Stanton County, 145 Neb. 220, 15 N.W.2d 757 (1944) (dictum); Alco
Finance Co. v. Moran, 178 Okla. 575, 63 P.2d 747 (1936); Cavaness v.
General Corp., 272 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Mauritz v. Schwind,
101 S.W.2d 1085 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
"0See, e.g., California Fruit Exch. v. Buck, 163 Cal. 223, 124 Pac. 824
(1912); California Cured Fruit Ass'n v. Stelling, 141 Cal. 713, 75 Pac.
320 (1904); Grangers' Business Ass'n v. Clark, 67 Cal. 634, 8 Pac. 445
(1885); Flash Cleaners v. Columbia Appliance Corp., 319 P.2d 454 (Cal.
App. 1957); Wynn v. Treasure Co., 303 P.2d 1067 (Cal. App. 1956); City
of Jefferson v. Holder, 195 Ga. 346, 24 S.E.2d 187 (1943); West v. Flynn
Realty Co., 53 Ga. App. 594, 186 S.E. 753 (1936); Lowell-Woodard Hardware Co. v. Woods, 104 Kan. 729, 180 Pac. 734 (1919) ; McGuire v. Bastain
Blessing Co., 275 Ky. 622, 122 S.W.2d 513 (1938); Richards v. Minnesota Say. Bank, 75 Minn. 196, 77 N.W. 822 (1899); Continental Ins. Co.
v. Richardson, 69 Minn. 433, 72 N.W. 458 (1897); Columbia Elec. Co. - .
Dixon, 46 Minn. 463, 49 N.W. 244 (1891); Minnesota Gas Light Economizer Co. v. Denslow, 46 Minn. 171, 48 N.W. 771 (1891); Springfield
Tobacco Redryers Corp. v. City of Springfield, 293 S.W.2d 189 (Tenn.
1956); Ingle System Co. v. Norris & Hall, 132 Tenn. 472, 178 S.W. 1113
(1915); Dickenson v. Boyd, 167 Va. 90, 187 S.E. 479 (1936).
" In Mauritz v. Schwind, 101 S.W.2d 1085 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), the
court said:
Estoppel by contract is not, strictly speaking, an estoppel in pais,
because it lacks several of the essential elements of an estoppel in
pais but is regarded merely a form of quasi estoppel based on the
idea that a party to a contract will not be permitted to take a position inconsistent with its provisions, to the prejudice of another.
Id. at 1092.
"See cases cited note 19 supra.
"We agree that no full, formal, technical estoppel to deny corporate
existence arises from such a state of facts, but we think it accords with
modem views of good practice and tends to promote substantial justice ......
Lowell-Woodard Hardware Co. v. Woods, 104 Kan. 729, 730, 180 Pac.
734 (1919). "[Y]et as between private litigants they may, by their agreements, admissions, or conduct, place themselves where they would not be
permitted to deny the facts of the existence of the corporation." Ingle
System Co. v. Norris & Hall, 132 Tenn. 472, 474, 178 S.W. 1113, 1114
-.

(1915).

"Mechanics' Lumber Co. v. Yates Am. Mach. Co., 181 Ark. 415, 26
S.W.2d 80 (1930); Wynn v. Treasure Co., 303 P.2d 1067 (Cal. App.
1956); Rialto Co. v. Miner, 183 Mo. App. 119, 166 S.W. 629 (1914);
Bell v. Commercial Inv. Trust Co., 118 Okla. 230, 246 Pac. 1102 (1926);
Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Biggs, 205 Ore. 473, 288 P.2d 1025 (1955). See
generally Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 1449 (1957).
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a third party, having dealt with a defective corporation on the basis
that it is a corporation, attempts to hold the members personally
liable.24 It seems the best result is to estop the third party from
denying the existence of the corporation, 25 except where the members knowingly misrepresented the status of the association. 2' To
hold otherwise allows the third party a right against the members
that he did not bargain for and imposes liability on the members
that they did not agree to assume." With the flexibility of the
estoppel doctrine, applied sparingly where justice demands it, the
intention of the parties is carried out and security of transactions is
maintained.
On this analysis, the Robertson case erred when it abolished
both the estoppel and the de facto concepts. The other eight jurisdictions 2s that have enacted these two sections of the Model Act
have not construed them as abolishing the concept of estoppel. The
injustice that would result from abolishing corporation by estoppel
as well as de facto corporations seems great. For instance, where
a purported corporation has contracted with a third party or otherwise incurred liability before obtaining its certificate, it clearly
should not be allowed to escape liability by denying its existence.
Another example is illustrated by Cranson v. InternationalBusiness
2, See Frey, Legal Analysis and the "De Facto" Doctrine, 100 U. PA.
L. REv. 1153, 1178 (1952).
2 See Whitney v. Wyman, 101 U.S. 392 (1879); Magnolia Shingle
Co. v. J. Zimmern's Co., 3 Ala. App. 578, 58 So. 90 (1912); Wesco Supply
Co. v. Smith, 134 Ark. 23, 203 S.W. 6 (1918) ; Tarbell v. Page, 24 Ill. 46
(1860); Heald v. Owen, 79 Iowa 23, 44 N.W. 210 (1890); John Lucas &
Co. v. Bernhardt's Estate, 156 La. 207, 100 So. 399 (1924); Tulane Improvement Co. v. S. A. Chapman & Co., 129 La. 562, 56 So. 509 (1911);
Berlin Bank v. Nelson, 231 Mich. 463, 204 N.W. 92 (1925); Tisch Auto
Supply Co. v. Nelson, 222 Mich. 196, 192 N.W. 600 (1923); Lockwood
v. Wynkoop, 178 Mich. 388, 144 N.W. 846 (1914); A. W. Mendenhall Co.
v. Booher, 226 Mo. App. 945, 48 S.W.2d 120 (1932); Mason v. Stephens,
16 S.D. 320, 92 N.W. 424 (1902). For cases contra to this view, see Frey,
supra note 24, at 1159 n. 2 1.
" -iele v. Torrance Millworks, Inc., 272 P.2d 780 (Cal. App. 1954);
Ryan v. Katz, 126 Conn. 555, 12 A.2d 835 (1940); Parker Peanut Co. v.
Felder, 200 S.C. 203, 20 S.E.2d 716 (1942).
' Carpenter, De Facto Corporations, 25 HARV. L. REv. 623, 633-35
(1912); Carpenter, Are the Members of a Defectively Organized Corporation Liable as Partners?,8 MiNN. L. REv. 409, 421 (1924).
"8 ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 10.05.261, .810 (1962); COLO. REV. STAT. §9
31-28-4, -29-4 (Perm. Supp. 1960); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.49, .150
(1954); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 496A. 51, 141 (1962); N.D. REV. CODE §§
10-19-23, -55 (1960); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 57.321, .793 (1963); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 16-10-51, -139 (1962); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-36.48, .122 (Supp. 1963).
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Inc.,2"

Machs.,
where the defendant had served as an officer and
director of what he innocently thought to be a validly organized
corporation. Because of an oversight of the attorney, the certificate
of incorporation had not been filed at the time the corporation
dealt with the plaintiff. When the corporation subsequently failed,
the plaintiff sued the defendant individually, contending that the
failure to file the certificate precluded all corporate existence. Although the court did not decide whether failure to file precluded
de facto corporateness, it did expressly hold that estoppel was not
precluded by such failure and that the plaintiff was estopped to deny
the existence of the corporation and sue the defendant personally.3"
With respect to the estoppel question, such a holding seems much
sounder than that of Robertson.
The Robertson holding that a de jure corporation arises only
on issuance of the certificate of incorporation leaves uncertain the
protection to third parties where the certificate is issued but the
corporation does not complete its organization. This problem is
most acute where no capital has been paid in. The third party
cannot sue the associates personally since de jure corporateness
began when the certificate was issued. But, if the corporation is
without assets, a suit against it would avail nothing. Statutory
solutions to this problem vary. In all but seventeen states a minimum capital must be paid in before a corporation starts its business."' Many of these states, including North Carolina, 2 make
directors jointly and severally liable to the corporation if it prematurely commences business.3 3 Other states expressly provide that
the directors are liable to third parties for the debts of the corporation where business is commenced before the required capital is
paid into the corporation. 34 The most apparent shortcoming of these
statutes is that the directors are liable only to the extent of the
capital that was required, either by statute or by the articles of
- 0200 A.2d 33 (Md. 1964).
0Id. at 39.
1See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoinP. AcT
(1960, Supp. 1964).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5 5-32 (g) (1960).

ANN.

§ 51,

2.02, 2.03

"8See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. Coin. AcT. ANN. § 43,
2.02, at 15
(1960). States which have enacted this section are Alaska, Illinois, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Wisconsin, and the District
of Columbia.
', Id. at 16.
States which have enacted this section are Idaho, Kansas,
Louisiana, Washington, and Vermont.
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incorporation, to be paid in before the corporation was to commence
business.8 5 Nevertheless, statutes of this type offer some protection
to third parties who have dealt with such corporations. In addition
to this protection, an awareness of this problem by persons who deal
with corporations and inquiry by them as to the financial condition
of such corporations should do much to protect third parties in this
situation.
WILLIAm L.

STOCKS

C6rporations-Restricted Stock Transfers-First Options Consequent
Upon the Death of Shareholder
In the recent case of Globe Slicing Mach. Co. v. Hasner,1 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a bylaw2 prohibiting the sale or disposition of the capital stock by a shareholder
without first offering the same to the corporation or remaining
shareholders was inapplicable to a transfer consequent upon the
death of a shareholder and effected pursuant to the shareholder's
will. The court, interpreting the bylaw provisions under the New
York policy of construing first option restraints narrowly, stated:
"First option provisions in order effectively to restrain dispositions
by will must specifically so provide. This was not done here."8
The question now arises whether or not a narrow construction
of such bylaw restrictions is justifiable in view of the reasons for
their existence.' The usual purpose of such restrictions is to main' See note 34 supra. But see S.C. CODE § 12-14.6(b) (Supp. 1964),
which provides:
If a corporation has transacted any business in violation of this section, any person (whether a promoter, incorporator, shareholder,
subscriber, or director) who has participated therein, shall be jointly and severally liable for the debts or liabilities of the corporation
arising therefrom.
1333 F.2d 413 (2d Cir. 1964).

' No sale or disposition of any shares of the capital stock of this
corporation by any stockholder shall be valid unless and until he
shall give notice in writing of such intention to the corporation, and
to all the present stockholders of the company

. . .

whereupon the

company and all of said stockholders shall jointly and/or severally
have the option and right to purchase the same within thirty days
after receiving such notice ....

Id. 3at 414.
Id.at 415.
'In the management of corporations few things are more apparent
than the desire to keep the control in the same hands of people

